This paper studies the effects of taxation on output volatility in OECD countries to shed light on the sources of observed heterogeneity over time and across countries. To this end, we derive tax effects on macro aggregates in a stochastic neoclassical model. As a result, taxes are shown to affect the second moment of output growth rates without (long-run) effects on the first moment. Taking the model to the data, we exploit observed heterogeneity patterns to estimate effects of tax rates on macro volatility using panel estimation, explicitly modeling the unobserved variance process. We find a strong empirical link between effective tax rates and output volatility, with some evidence of a cointegrating relationship. In accordance with theory, taxes on labor income and corporate income empirically are found to be negatively related to volatility of macro aggregates whereas the capital tax ratio has positive effects.
Introduction
Macroeconomic volatility is a complex phenomenon. Usually in stochastic models (Kydland and Prescott 1982, Long and Plosser 1983) , the variance of the innovations to technology is considered to be exogenous by construction. However, it can be shown that the volatility of macro aggregates in these models is not purely exogenous, but explained by fundamentals.
For illustration, any measure of dispersion of aggregate output is not only determined by the variance of some initial impulse, but also the outcome of an endogenous shock transmission.
Intuitively, the variance of output growth rates depends on the variance of the growth rate of the underlying stochastic process (of the stochastic impulse) and the variance of the growth rate of factor inputs, which in turn depends on model parameters. In addition, the stochastic impulse itself might be the result of an endogenous decision problem as in the growing through cycles literature (Bental and Peled 1996 , Matsuyama 1999 , Francois and Lloyd-Ellis 2003 , Wälde 2005 and thus endogenous by nature. In either case individual decisions affect output volatility. By changing incentives taxes affect individual decisions.
Accordingly, taxes and output volatility may be linked.
Our empirical motivation stems from the fact that major US tax reforms took place around the point in time where the break in output volatility is usually identified.
1 In this period, the focus of US policy debates was on the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, the first of the famous Reagan tax cuts (also known as Kemp-Roth Tax Cut).
A second reform was announced in May 1984, with large economic effects (Auerbach and Slemrod 1997) . Similarly, the moderation of output volatility in the UK was accompanied by massive tax cuts (Giles and Johnson 1995) .
2 Effective tax rates indeed show abrupt changes during the volatility slowdown for both the US and the UK, and also differ substantially across countries (Mendoza et al. 1994, Carey and Rabesona 2004) . The objective of this paper is to investigate whether there is a general link between taxes and output volatility. While the heterogeneity of output volatility over time and across countries has been widely recognized in the literature, its cause remains subject to controversy (Stock and Watson 2002, 2005) . Although there are a few exceptions, in general, little attention has been paid to the determinants of output volatility in this debate. Many economists refer to taxation as a major distortion in the economy. This makes it quite surprising that taxes have not been noticed among the potential candidates to explain volatility patterns. The contribution of this paper is twofold. From a purely theoretical perspective, we show that in a stochastic version of the neoclassical model the (long-run) effect of distortionary
In the paper we proceed as follows. Section 2 studies tax effects on output volatility in a neoclassical model. Section 3 briefly describes the estimation strategy and the underlying measures. Section 4 presents the empirical results using various specifications. Section 5 provides a summary and concluding remarks.
Taxes and output volatility
This section provides a theoretical model for tax effects on output volatility. In order to save space, we relegate most of the derivations and proofs to the appendix.
The model
As the technological setup of the economy is close to (Posch and Wälde 2006, Posch 2007), we keep the first part brief. The introduction of government activities and the implications for household behavior are new and will be presented in more detail.
Production possibilities. The single production good is produced according to a standard Cobb-Douglas function,
where L denotes total constant labor supply. In the tradition of standard macro models (King et al. 1988 ), A t denotes total factor productivity and X t labor augmenting technology.
Output Y t is used for producing consumption goods C t and investment goods I t . Aggregate capital stock increases if gross investment I t exceeds depreciation δK t ,
Uncertainty enters via two exogenous independent stochastic processes: a (geometric) diffusion with drift, A t , driven by a standard Brownian motion z t , and a (geometric) jump process, X t , driven by a standard Poisson process q t ,
respectively. 4 We model the jump size proportional to its value an instant before the jump, Government. The government levies taxes on income, τ i , on wealth, τ a , on consumption expenditures, τ c , and on investment expenditures, τ k . It uses all revenues (cannot save or run debt) to provide basic government services G, G t = τ i (Y t − δK t ) + τ k (I t − δK t ) + τ c C t + τ a (1 + τ k )K t ≥ 0.
In this paper, we assume a myopic government simply providing basic government services without interest in neither stabilization policy nor optimal taxation. The tax structure thus is exogenously given to the model. Similarly, the absence of debt therefore is not relevant because we want to illustrate the incentive effects of distortionary taxation on output growth volatility of an elsewise frictionless economy. One could interpret the taxes as wedges between competitive prices and observed prices (Chari et al. 2007) . Additional effects through the channel of fiscal debt might be interesting but beyond the scope of the paper.
Preferences. The economy is populated by a large number of infinitely-lived identical individuals, each sufficiently small to neglect effects on aggregate variables. Each consumer maximizes expected utility, U 0 , given by the integral over instantaneous utilities, u, resulting from consumption flows, c t , discounted at the rate of time preference, ρ,
where instantaneous utility is characterized by constant relative risk aversion, u(c t ) = c 1−σ t 1 − σ , σ > 0.
The budget constraint of the representative household reads (cf. Appendix A.1.1)
where w t denotes the real wage rate, and r t the rental rate of capital both before tax.
Equilibrium properties. In equilibrium, factors are rewarded by w t = Y L , and r t = Y K (value marginal product), respectively. The market clearing condition demands
Note that the quantities C t and I t are after taxation. Since markets are perfectly competitive, the producer price of the production, consumption, and investment good will be identical,
When consumption and investment goods are sold, they are taxed differently such that consumer prices are (1 + τ c ) p c t and (1 + τ k ) p k t , respectively. In order to rule out arbitrage between different types of goods, we assume that once a unit of production is assigned for a special purpose it is useless for other purposes.
Solving the model requires the first order condition for consumption, the aggregate capital accumulation constraint (2), the goods market equilibrium (9), and optimality conditions of perfectly competitive firms. Thus we obtain a system of differential equations determining, given initial conditions, the time paths of C t , K t , Y t , G t , as well as of w t and r t .
Explicit solutions
Applying Itô's formula (or change of variable formula, cf. Sennewald 2007), the assumed production function in (1) implies that output evolves according to
It describes a stochastic differential equation (SDE), more precisely a jump-diffusion process which, for solving, demands more information about the behavior of households. In that the growth rate of the capital stock, (dK t /dt)/K t , is determined by households. We refer to this as the internal propagation mechanism. The impulses will be propagated contemporaneously as well as inter-temporally via capital accumulation. The standard approach to solve the model is to consider a stationary system of equations
and linearize the system to analyze transitional dynamics often around the non-stochastic steady state (among others King et al. 1988 , Uhlig 1995 . To illustrate tax effects on the volatility of macro aggregates, we restrict ourselves to particular parameter restrictions under which the model has explicit solutions. Based on them, simulations can be done without relying on the efficiency of numerical methods or linearization and certainty analysis. It is well known from deterministic continuous-time models that at least for two cases we obtain unique analytical solutions. Note that restrictions on the parameter range are widely used in economics to study explicit dynamics (among others Xie 1991).
Theorem 2.1 If the output elasticity of the capital stock equals the parameter of the utility function, α = σ, consumption is a linear function of the capital stock, C t = 1+τ k 1+τc φK t , where
Proof. Appendix A.2.2.
Corollary 2.2 The (before tax) rental rate of capital follows dr t = c 1 r t (c 2 − r t ) dt + ηr t dz t + (exp(ν) − 1)r t− dq t ,
where c 1 ≡ 1−α α 1−τ i 1+τ k
, and c 2 ≡
The SDE in (13) is a geometric mean-reverting jump-diffusion process and denotes a stochastic Verhulst equation (Sørensen 1991, p.97) . Accordingly, c 2 defines the non-stochastic steady state or tendency parameter to which r t reverts, and c 1 is the speed of reversion.
Corollary 2.3 The growth rate of output per unit of time, g ∆ , reads
r s ds +η(z t − z t−∆ ) + ν(q t − q t−∆ ).
Intuitively, the growth rate consists of a deterministic part and the integral over capital rewards (the memory of the stochastic process), the Brownian motion component, and the jump component. Another solution where σ > 1 gives exactly the same structure and is provided in the appendix. Note that the integral over capital rewards refers to the growth rate of the capital stock in (11) which in turn is determined by the investment decisions. The next corollary clearly demonstrates that this integral has an intuitive economic interpretation and indeed stems from the optimization problem of the representative household. 
It can be interpreted as the discrete version of the Euler equation the case of α = σ. By implementing their optimal strategy, households affect the output growth rate in the short run by their consumption-saving decision. In what follows we show that (long-run) tax effects on the volatility of growth rates are due to this channel.
Theoretical effects of taxation
We are now interested in the tax effects on the output growth rate per unit of time. Clearly as a standard result, taxation affects growth rates in the short run directly as well as indirectly via capital accumulation as from (14) and (15), which has already been widely discussed in the literature. To derive effects of taxation on the distribution of growth rates, however, it will be necessary to look at long-run effects or moments of the growth rate.
It follows from the economy's resource constraint (9) that aggregate consumption in expectation can only grow at constant rates indefinitely if it grows at the same expected rate as output. In particular, we observe Eg ∆ = Eg c ∆ , and obtain (see Appendix A.2.7)
V ar(g ∆ ) = V ar 1 − τ i 1 + τ k t t−∆ r s ds + η(z t − z t−∆ ) + ν(q t − q t−∆ ) .
On the one hand we obtain the standard result that in a model of exogenous growth taxes do not affect the (long-run) first moment of the growth rate (16). Comparing the result to a corresponding deterministic setup, two additional terms appear. First, a negative term, − 1 2 η 2 , often referred to as precautionary savings component (or Jensen's inequality term).
Second, an intuitive positive component, νλ, resulting from the discrete arrivals of new technologies, simply denoting the arrival rate times the size of the jumps. On the other hand, though completely neglecting transitional effects, taxes do affect the (long-run) variance of the growth rate indirectly by affecting the variance of the rental rate of capital, a result which has been neglected so far. Moreover, it is easily conceivable that if the variance, λ, and/or the size of impulses, ν, were endogenous as well (growing through cycles models), taxes could even directly affect the variability of the output growth rate. Unfortunately, the analytic derivation of the second moment of r t is tedious and thus omitted here (one may use the explicit solution of r t to derive the moments). 5 We suffice to show tax effects on higher moments of r t by demonstrating that -in contrast to the growth rate of output and consumption -its first moment depends on tax rates, and derive effects on the second moment by intuition as well as through simulations. Using (14) together with (16), the first moment of capital rewards can be derived as,
Recalling from (13) that innovations to r t are proportional to the level, namely ηr t dz t and (exp(ν) − 1)r t− dq t , an increase in the first moment also leads to a higher variability of r t . Obviously, the first moment in (19) is positively affected by the investment tax, τ k , the income tax, τ i (neglecting Jensen's inequality term), as well as the tax on wealth, τ a . Similarly as from (19), the first moment of the after-tax rental rate of capital, 1−τ i 1+τ k E(r t ) is negatively affected by τ k and τ i by lowering the effective depreciation rate, and positively affected by τ a . Because the latter contributes to the variability of output growth in (17), tax effects on 5 An analytical measure of macroeconomic volatility as well as analytical tax effects in an endogenous growing trough cycle model are contained in Posch and Wälde (2006) . the variance of output growth tend to be positive for τ a , but negative for τ i and τ k , whereas the tax on consumption, τ c , is neutral.
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Economically speaking, a positive tax on wealth, τ a > 0, distorts the consumption-saving decision. Incentives for capital accumulation will be lower since net capital returns decrease like the effect of an increased depreciation rate. Individuals prefer more consumption today than deferring it to the future. The non-stochastic steady state value for capital rewards increases (effective capital stock decreases) as less resources are used for capital accumulation.
Because innovations increase proportionally, they result into a higher variance of capital rewards. As this variance contributes to the propagation component of output volatility, an increase in τ a finally translates into higher output volatility in (17).
Simulated effects of taxation
In this section we derive qualitative and quantitative effects of tax rates on moments of different macro aggregates. Due to the simplicity of our model we do not aim to match the data. Our quantitative effects could be magnified by introducing various kinds of price rigidities or adjustment costs which are known to lower the dynamics of macro variables. These experiments are intended to serve as exercises that are illustrative of tax effects in the neoclassical stochastic growth model, abstracting from any further kinds of distortions.
There is a large literature studying the effects of fiscal policy on GDP and its components, e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) analyze the effects of tax shocks on output. However, little attention has been given to study tax effects on the shock propagation. The empirical literature also suggests that the propagation component has changed substantially over time, contributing to the volatility decline after 1980 (see Perotti 2005 and the references therein). As shown above, taxes do not affect the (long-run) mean of the growth rate while affecting the variance of output growth by changing the propagation of shocks. Hence, our findings are consistent with the VAR evidence that on the one hand effects of fiscal policy on the mean output growth rate are generally small or temporary, and that on the other hand the propagation mechanism has changed substantially after 1980s. Greenwood and Huffman (1991) find simulating a RBC model that distortional taxes (income taxes as well as a negative investment tax) tend to amplify technology shocks, relative to what would happen if there were no such taxes. Based on explicit solutions we confirm their numerical finding of an endogenous shock amplifier in the neoclassical model. However, as shown above, tax effects are more versatile, specifying and extending their numerical findings. For example, given our explicit solution, the income tax, τ i , as well Notes: This table shows the qualitative tax effects of time-invariant tax rates on macro variables. The measures include the mean and sd of output growth rates, the sd of HP-filtered cyclical components, the mean and sd of before-tax capital rewards, the mean and sd of consumption growth rates, the cv of cyclical utility, as well as the sd of cyclical output as percentage deviations from a steady state. Note that these are long-run effects, i.e. abstract from transitional dynamics after a tax change.
as the investment tax, τ k , increase the volatility of macro aggregates in efficiency units by lowering the effective rate of depreciation (cf. also Posch and Wälde 2006), but decrease output and consumption growth volatility. The intuition behind this result is that variables in efficiency units tend to increase whenever (after-tax) capital rewards decrease.
In Table 1 , we summarize qualitative tax effects on macro volatility. Given our explicit solution, as long as we have positive depreciation (δ > 0) together with the presence of shocks, the qualitative effects are independent of model calibration and parametrization.
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For comparison with previous work, two further measures are introduced. The first, cv(û t ), denotes a scale independent measure of dispersion based on the coefficient of variation (cv) of stochastically detrended instantaneous utility (Posch and Wälde 2006) . The second measure, sd(ŷ t −ŷ) is based on a widely used macro variable denoting percentage deviations of cyclical output from some steady state (Greenwood and Huffman 1991) . Both measures are based on stationary cyclical components of a Beveridge-Nelson type decomposed series. In addition, qualitative effects on HP-filtered cyclical components based on simulations are reported.
To examine the quantitative effects of tax rates on macro volatility, we compute semielasticities in the appendix (Table A. 1). For a plausible tax scenario (details are below), the predicted change in macro volatility is sizable. It ranges depending on the measure between −6.4% for output growth volatility to −22.8% for consumption growth volatility.
Taking the model to the data
After having attained the theoretical effects as well as the simulated results, we want to obtain empirical estimates. To this end, we use our explicit solution for the growth rates to illustrate our empirical strategy. We rewrite (14) as
where the residual variable, ε ∆ , reads after inserting (14) and (18),
which has mean zero and tax-dependent variance. It simply denotes the deviation of the actual growth rate from its long-run mean, or capturing the transitional dynamics of the neoclassical model. If capital rewards are above average (technically if the capital stock is below its non-stochastic steady state), the growth rate is higher than its long-run mean.
From an econometric point of view, we can exploit the fact that ε ∆ is a residual term with mean zero and tax-dependent variance by explicitly modeling (and estimating) an unobserved heteroscedasticity process as follows,
Simply neglecting transitional dynamics in the growth equation allows us to analyze the properties of a model where the second rather than the first moment depends on tax rates.
Data and estimation strategy
Our approach to studying differences in output volatility is to employ a panel of 20 OECD countries spanning the years 1970 to 2004. It provides the possibility of generating more accurate predictions for individual observations than time series data alone. If countries behave similar conditional on certain variables, as we would expect for incentives through tax rates, panel data provide the possibility of learning the behavior of a single country by observing the behavior of other countries (cf. Hsiao 2003).
Data. In what follows we construct empirical measures of output volatility as well as measures of the effective tax burden at the macro level. There seems to be a consensus in 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 0.010 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 Japan 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 0.005 0.020 0.035
Germany

United States
Notes: These figures compare observed volatility measures for key countries starting in 1970. The first measure results from a fixed-window (five-years) approach gathering the period specific sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita, while the second measure is based on five-year rolling sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita.
the literature on the "Great Moderation" that an appropriate empirical measure of output volatility is based on the sd of the real GDP growth rate. As results are robust with respect to different measures, our focus is on the sd of annual growth rates per capita (AP C).
9 Though the main reason for using data with annual frequency is the availability of tax measures, our results will not depend on a specific method of seasonal adjustment in the data which might be worrisome when analyzing volatility patterns.
In order to compute meaningful measures of output volatility, we need either to collapse several observations into one period using fixed windows or using a rolling window approach.
While the first approach throws away a lot of information, the latter has some dubious statistical properties. Nonetheless they are useful for the purpose of illustration, and widely Table 2 : Linking theoretical tax rates to tax ratios income tax, consumption investment tax on wealth, 's (1994) definitions (see Appendix A.4.2), LABOR denotes the labor income tax ratio, CAP IT AL is capital tax ratio (including taxes on property), CORP is the corporate income tax ratio, CON S is the consumption tax ratio. Taxes on investment goods are included only in the Carey and Rabesona (2004) tax ratio.
used in the literature. To compare our results with other studies, it seems convenient to have both. For the first approach, we make use of two windows (five-years and ten-years), and gather the mean and the standard deviation of variables over the respective time periods starting in 1970. In the latter approach, we use the five-year rolling standard deviation of output growth rates as in Blanchard and Simon (2001) . Both measures clearly indicate that output volatility differs substantially over time and across countries (cf. Figure 1) .
To measure the average tax burden of a representative household on the macro level we choose the approach of Mendoza et al. (1994) .
10 Accordingly, we employ three different types of taxes, namely a labor income tax measuring the tax induced cost of dependent labor (LABOR), i.e. taxes on household labor income, security charges and payroll taxes; a capital tax measuring the cost of capital through taxation (CAP IT AL), i.e. taxes on capital income, taxes on the capital stock as well as on capital transactions; a corporate income tax measuring the tax burden of corporations (CORP ); and a consumption tax (CON S), i.e. taxes on goods and services and excise taxes. Most notably, though often labeled as an income tax, CAP IT AL contains taxes on property, including recurrent taxes on immovable property as well as taxes on financial and capital transactions. 11 This comprises inheritance taxes which, given an infinite horizon framework, rather could be interpreted as taxes on wealth than on income. To this end, the empirical tax ratios convey the meaning of theoretical tax rates as summarized in Table 2 . In that view, LABOR and CORP are pure taxes on income, whereas CAP IT AL measures the tax burden associated with capital income, capital flows and the capital stock. Figure 2 shows the time path of tax ratios and five-year standard deviation of output growth rates for major countries from 1970, illustrating the time dimension of our panel. 10 We also used modifications of Carey and Rabesona (2004) for effective tax rates with similar results. 11 Ideally the tax on the capital stock should be separated from the tax on capital income as effects on volatility are different. However due to missing data of the tax base for most countries, i.e. measures of the capital stock, we follow the common practice and allocate these taxes to the cost of capital (CAP IT AL). Notes: These figures illustrate the time paths of tax ratios for capital (CAP IT AL, solid), labor income (LABOR, dashed), and consumption (CON S, dotted) together with the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita (dot-dashed) using the fixed-window (five-years) approach (cf. Figure 1 , dot-dashed) for key countries (1970=1).
Its seems notable that abrupt changes of CAP IT AL as a result of major tax reforms that coincide with breaks in output volatility in the 1980s and the 1990s can be observed for the UK and the US, respectively. For illustration, the UK capital transfer tax (replaced by the inheritance tax in 1986) was cut from 75 percent in 1984 to 40 percent in 1988 accompanied by an increase of the threshold from 25, 000£ in 1980 to 200, 000£ in 1995. As a matter of fact, the contribution of property tax revenues to CAP IT AL in the UK substantially declined from 30.2 percentage points in 1981 to 13.8 percentage points in 1992. Similarly, there is considerable heterogeneity in the cross-sectional dimension of our panel as illustrated in scatter plots of output volatility versus tax rates (see Appendix A.5, Figures A.1 and A. 3), respectively. Though there seem to be some regularities in the data, no clear cut conclusion can be drawn by simply looking at the graphs.
Other controls used in volatility estimations (cf. Blanchard and Simon 2001 , Denizer et al. 2002 , Lensink and Scholtens 2004 , Cecchetti et al. 2006 include the average growth rate of real per capita output (GROW ), the mean and sd of the inflation rate (IN F L, IN F LSD), the mean and sd of government final consumption expenditures as a share of output (GGDP , GGDP SD), the degree of openness of the economy as measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to output (OP EN ), the sd of real effective exchange rates (XRSD), as well as the allocation of total credit to the private sector as percentage of GDP measuring financial development (P RIV Y ). Basically, it is assumed that financial systems that allocate more credit to the private sector are more engaged in providing risk management services. Estimation strategy. We are now prepared to address our empirical question: conditional on other controls, does output volatility vary systematically with tax rates? To this end, we jointly estimate the parameters of the following system,
Here, ∆y it is the growth rate of output per capita for country i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T , expressed in log differences. In that θ i is a country-specific mean and σ it denotes the sd of the residuals ε it . Our primary focus is on the unobserved volatility process (21b) which models the log of σ it as a linear function of country-and time-specific effects, α i + λ t , as well as tax rates, x it , and other controls, z it . This specification simply ensures that σ it is positive. Another convenient property is that semi-elasticities can easily be obtained for both the variance and the sd of output growth rates as they are proportional, log(σ 2 it ) = 2 log(σ it ). In the terminology of Nelson (1991), our system (21a) to (21b) is nested in an exponential autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model. Our approach substantially extends the econometric framework of Ramey and Ramey (1995) , giving more flexibility for the conditional variance to vary over time by including additional controls and D time dummies. The parameter vector ϑ = (θ 1 , ..., θ N , λ 1 , ...λ D , β, γ) will be estimated jointly using maximum likelihood (ML) in which the variances are treated as parameters. It is straightforward to show that the log-likelihood function reads apart from a constant
Moreover, under sufficient regularity conditions, the maximum likelihood estimator is consistent and asymptotic normal. We use this result to obtain asymptotic standard errors based on the information matrix using the outer product estimate.
12 Comparing our model to Section 2.5, the assumption of normality seems not appropriate in the presence of jumps. A natural way to proceed is using either the correct (unknown) distribution or a quasi-maximum estimation technique. To start with, we simply assume normality and leave it for future research.
For a quick look at the data, we begin estimating the following econometric model,
using observed volatility measures, σ it , denoting the sd of annual output growth rates per capita in the fixed window t = 1, ..., T , where T = 7 (five-years) or T = 4 (ten-years), for country i = 1, ..., N . 13 Similar to (21b), the log of σ it is modeled as a function of country-and time-specific effects, α i + λ t , tax rates, x it , other controls, z it , and an uncorrelated error term with mean zero and equal variance, u it . A straightforward strategy is to obtain parameter estimates using the least square dummy variable (LSDV) approach. To avoid that results are driven by few outliers, we also use iterated weighted least squares (IWLS) estimation.
14 So far, we have treated our variables by country as I(0). However, tax rates or other controls may be (locally) non-stationary. If tax rates and (unobserved) output volatility actually are I(1), respectively, our results may be either spurious or superconsistent. The latter is true if there was a cointegrating relationship. Obviously, a formal test of cointegration cannot be applied to unobserved variables. Nevertheless, to strengthen our result of a long-run relationship between taxes and output volatility, we extend our analysis to a dynamic approach, assuming variables by country to be at least I(1),
with given country-specific initial conditions σ i,0 . Obviously, the estimated parameters are not directly comparable with the static approach (21b) as long as ρ = −1. Note that our approach closely follows the cointegration idea similar to an error correction specification:
Suppose that tax rates and output volatility are not cointegrated. In order to balance the time series property that the left-hand side of (24b) is stationary, β and γ as well as ρ cannot be different from zero to obtain stationarity on the right-hand side (note that if the controls were stationary before, there is no point in that extension). 15 Collecting terms in (24b), the system turns out to be nested in an exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model (Nelson 1991). Once we obtained the parameter estimates, we can actually check whether or not the conditional variance is I(1).
13 See Blanchard and Simon (2001) or a recent study by Jaimovich and Siu (2007) for a similar specification. One concern in this specification is that the results might be spurious. As the time horizon using the fixedwindow specification is very short, this is not as problematic as using rolling-windows.
14 It is well known that the least squares estimator is particularly sensitive to small numbers of atypical data points when the sample size is small or moderate. Using regression diagnostics for influential data points (leave-one-out deletion) suggests that a small number of observations have potentially large effects. 15 We are not aware of any research on cointegration within the conditional variance equation. According to the standard cointegration principle, however, one should add an error term to equation (24b) as in (25). This would lead to a stochastic volatility model which might be an interesting path for future research.
As a quick check, we estimate an error correction specification similar to (24b),
where σ it denotes the observed sd of annual output growth rates per capita in the five-year fixed-window t for country i, and v it again is an uncorrelated error term with mean zero and equal variance. A formal test of no cointegration amounts to testing the null hypothesis of the parameters in front of the controls to be zero (cf. Banerjee 1999).
Empirical results
This section gives the estimation results. Following our estimation strategy, we use observed volatility measures as initial estimates to get a general idea about effects present in the data.
We then fully exploit the panel structure by treating unobserved variances as parameters.
Initial estimates
Static panel estimation. A quick answer to the empirical question is summarized in Table 3 which gives estimates for the semi-elasticities of various controls on observed output growth volatility (percentage change of σ it given a percentage point increase of the control variable)
for our model in (23). It shows that output volatility indeed can be explained by various fundamentals capturing roughly half of the variability of our volatility measure. Our key parameter vector of interest is β, which links our empirical tax ratios to volatility. We find quite robust empirical evidence for tax effects on output volatility in line with our theoretical results (compare with Tables 1 and 2 ). Moreover, these effects are similar and about the same order of magnitude among different estimators, window spans, and various volatility measures (cf. also Appendix A.5). To summarize, effects of taxes on corporate income (CORP ) and on labor income (LABOR) are statistically significantly different from zero and negative. Holding constant other variables, an increase of LABOR by one percentage point decreases output volatility by five to eight percent. In contrast, the capital tax ratio (CAP IT AL) is positively related whereas the consumption tax (CON S) has no clear effect. Figures A.2 and A.4 illustrate the relationship by plotting taxes against estimated volatility, after removing the effects of other controls. Estimates of the other controls are in line with the literature. The estimate for the mean growth rate (GROW ) confirms a significantly negative effect on output volatility at least for the ten-year fixedwindow. Similar to other studies, the effect is quite sizable: a percentage point increase in the mean growth rate is associated with a decrease in output volatility by twenty to thirty percent (Lensink and Scholtens 2004, Aghion and Howitt 2006) . Measures of openness (OP EN ), (23) using the least square dummy variable approach (LSDV) and iterated weighed least squares estimation (IWLS), explaining the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita. Standard errors of White's heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimators (HCCME) in the LSDV approach, and of R = 4999 model-based bootstrap replicates using the adjusted percentile method for IWLS estimates are in parentheses.
exchange rate volatility (XRSD), government expenditures volatility (GGDP SD), inflation rate volatility (IN F LSD) are often positively related. Somewhat controversial, we find that the mean of inflation rate (IN F L) is negatively related to output volatility. In other studies either no statistically significant effect (Denizer et al. 2002) or a positive effect (Lensink and Scholtens 2004) is found. The sign for the effect of government expenditures (GGDP ) slightly indicates an active anti-cyclical government policy. However, the effects are fragile and insignificant in the specifications shown above. Similarly, in some specifications we find a significant negative effect of financial development (P RIV Y ) (see also Denizer et al. 2002 , Cecchetti et al. 2006 ). This result is not found to be robust which puts into question the importance of financial development being among the explanatory variables for the OECD countries, rather suggesting that it is mainly driven by a few outliers.
Dynamic panel estimation. To avoid a spurious association, we quickly check our results estimating (25). Collecting terms gives the endogenous variable log(σ it ) as a function of its lagged value and other controls. As is well known, the coefficients in dynamic panels are biased due to the presence of individual effects (Nickell 1981) . Various solution techniques have been proposed in the literature. Most approaches themselves have important drawbacks as they may require additional decisions regarding which and how many instruments to use or the performance may depend on model specific properties (see Bun and Carree 2005) .
In what follows, we use a bias-correction for the LSDV estimator as proposed by Bun and Carree. As a result we find only a small bias due the fact that the parameter of the lagged endogenous variable in the model, 1 + ρ, is close to zero (see Table 4 ). Our key parameter, ρ, therefore is estimated between −1.15 (0.11) and −1.32 (0.13) with associated biased corrected standard deviation in parentheses. A formal test of no cointegration, ρ = 0, would be rejected at any conventional significance level. An important caveat is that Monte Carlo experiments suggest that a time dimension (T = 6) is too short for residual-based tests for the null of no cointegration in order to draw meaningful inference (see Pedroni 2004).
A thorough investigation
We further examine the relationship between output growth volatility and various control variables including taxes by fully taking advantage of the panel structure of our data set.
Static panel estimation. We start estimating (21a) and (21a) without additional controls, then proceed using a similar specification as in Table 3 . However, we need to change the nature of the variables included in the z it vector as follows. To obtain volatility measures of shocks to the inflation rate, government expenditures, and the real effective exchange rate, respectively, we follow Ramey and Ramey (1995) and use the innovations to countryspecific one-step ahead forecasting equations that include a constant, a linear time trend, a quadratic time trend, and specific controls. Instead of squared residuals we use absolute values for better interpretation. For the innovations to the inflation forecast (IN F LF I) we make use of a generalized Phillips curve based on measures of aggregate activity (see Stock and Watson 1999). Accordingly, we add two lags of HP-filtered cyclical component of real GDP per capita as well as two lags of the inflation rate to the deterministic trends. As in Ramey and Ramey, shocks to the forecast of government-spending growth (DGF I) are based on two lags of the log level of real GDP per capita and two lags of the log level of government spending per capita. Finally, the forecast for the real effective exchange rate (XRF I) is based on two lags of the real effective exchange rate.
16
Observing a break in volatility in every year, that is D = T as for fixed-windows, does not seem plausible nor is computationally feasible. Nevertheless, there seems to be a consensus that we observe breaks in volatility over time. These events might not be fully captured by our controls. We therefore allow for time-specific breaks in the conditional variance by setting time dummies based on confidence intervals borrowed from Stock and Watson (2005) such that major breaks in volatility and other major events occurring broadly across countries are taken into account. Note that the assumption that these breaks occurred at the same time for all countries is strong.
17 However, it seems reasonable to account for the possibility that effects of important events spread over to other countries. To this end, we also include Because we want to address possible endogeneity problems arising with contemporaneous explanatory variables, we use one-period lagged values (cf. Table 5) . As a result, we obtain similar tax effects on output volatility as above (compare to Table 3 ). Note that 16 We exclude OP EN which turned out to be insignificant and uninformative for the whole estimation approach, while its effect seems to be fully captured by XRF I. Moreover, for technical reasons we have to drop GROW as an explanatory variable. We refer to the growth-volatility link in the next section.
17 Note that Stock and Watson (2005) only test for a single break date. Multiple break dates are e.g. in Cecchetti et al. (2006) suggesting that our dummies indeed capture breaks occurring broadly across countries. the similarity is striking as the result is based on a completely different estimation method. Moreover, even the order of magnitude for tax rates is roughly comparable to that of initial estimates obtained before. In that taxes on labor income (LABOR) and corporate income (CORP ) decrease output volatility, whereas the tax on capital (CAP IT AL) is associated with higher volatility. For example, a percentage point increase in CAP IT AL increases output volatility roughly about five percent, which again is substantially higher than simulated semi-elasticities just under one percent (cf. innovations to government expenditures are not significant.
19
For illustration, Figure 3 reports the estimated volatility patterns for key countries. It seems remarkable that the time paths as well cross country patterns are captured by the model. Interestingly, there are some differences in the explanatory power of control variables among countries. While for the UK and France taxes account for most of the variation (compare to Figures B.2 and B. 3), the time path for the other countries are captured only after including additional control variables. Note that including time-specific dummies improves the fit for some countries, but does not change the overall pattern.
Dynamic panel estimation. As explained above, estimating (24a) to (24b) jointly, by using the panel structure of our data more efficiently, we address the issue whether or not 19 Contemporaneous estimates which are available in a separate appendix suggest that IN F L and GGDP are significantly contributing to output volatility. We also experimented with excluding GGDP and IN F L as their lagged values are included in the forecasting equations; however, it does not change the results. our results are based on a cointegrating relationship. Note that our conclusions do not depend on time-fixed effects which may account for the non-stationarity to some extent.
Conversely, especially for the case without time-specific effects the estimated values should not be different from zero unless there was cointegration. To start up the recursion, we need pre-sample estimates for σ 2 it for t ≤ 0. As a natural choice, we use country-specific sample analogues σ
it (see Bollerslev 1986). As a result, estimated parameters are confirmative of a long-run relationship between taxes and output volatility: the lagged endogenous parameter in the dynamic G(AR)CH formulation, 1 + ρ, virtually is zero when including time-specific effects, implying that our key parameter is betweenρ = −0.95 (0.09) with asymptotic standard error in parenthesis (see Table 6 ). Without the additional time dummies, the estimated value of ρ is between 0.21 − 1 = −0.79 (0.07) and 0.31 − 1 = −0.69 (0.08), again significantly different from zero.
From the other controls, only the measure of inflation rate variability (IN F LF I) accentuates as a potential variable for a cointegrating relationship with output volatility. To compare the order of magnitude to the static approach (see Table 5 ), we have to scale the estimates for model (ii) and model (iv) by a factor of roughly 1.3 and 1.5 as from (24b), respectively, which then gives similar point estimates for the semi-elasticities.
For example, the parameter vector linking output volatility and tax rates, β, remains significantly different from zero for LABOR with an associated (long-run) semi-elasticity of −2.82/(1 − 0.21) = −3.6, for CAP IT AL with 4.72/(1 − 0.21) = 6.0, and for CORP with a (long-run) semi-elasticity of −2.6 (referring to the model (ii) of Table 6 ).
The link between volatility and growth
In a seminal paper, Ramey and Ramey (1995) study the link between volatility and growth. Their basic econometric framework is nested in a conditional heteroscedasticity in mean (GARCH-M) model without autoregressive components. In general the GARCH-M model, in which the conditional variance appears in the conditional mean, has an important drawback as no sufficient conditions for consistency and asymptotic normality are yet known.
Following common practice, we assume that the maximum likelihood estimator is consistent and asymptotic normal (see Nelson 1991).
To address the empirical link between volatility and growth, we jointly estimate the following system using maximum likelihood,
where ∆y it is the growth rate of output per capita for country i in year t, expressed as log difference; σ it is the sd of the residuals ε it ; whereas θ i allows for country-specific effects in the growth equation (26a), and α i + λ t are country-and time-specific effects in the variance equation (26b). Observe that compared to the system (21a) and (21b), only the conditional variance appears as an additional control in the growth equation. The results are shown in Table 7 . Our estimates suggest that not only the identified measures remain significantly related to output volatility (cf. Table 5 ), but volatility has a negative partial correlation with output growth. We compare a specification where similar to Ramey and Ramey (1995) government-spending induced volatility is used as a control (iv) to specifications where we include tax rates (iii), volatility patterns from forecasting equations for the inflation rate as well as for the real effective exchange rate (ii), and all variables that have been identified as potential controls (i). Our results confirm a robust empirical link between volatility and growth. Accounting for more heterogeneity indeed strengthens the relationship between volatility and growth among OECD countries.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to shed light on the link between tax rates and output volatility. We start from a purely theoretical perspective showing that in a stochastic version of the neoclassical growth model distortional taxes affect the variability of macro aggregates. Using explicit solutions, we identify the channels through which aggregate volatility is affected by optimizing households. We show that against conventional perceptions rather the second moment than the first moment of output growth rates is affected by taxes. In these models, individual decisions matter for macro volatility indirectly by affecting the variability of the rental rate of capital, which corresponds to the volatility of the growth rate of the capital stock, through their consumption-savings decision. There is also a potentially direct link by affecting the variance of the stochastic impulses (growing through cycles literature). In addition, the model was calibrated and simulated with tax semi-elasticities on different volatility measures of macro aggregates being derived.
Taking the model to the data, we make use of heterogeneity patterns in output volatility and tax rates to estimate tax effects on macro volatility using panel estimation. Our study brings out some strong empirical regularities in output volatility among OECD countries. Using several measures of volatility and various estimation techniques we find that taxes are important determinants in explaining differences across countries and over time. Tax rates are able to capture sometimes substantial parts of volatility patterns. Accounting for possible non-stationarity of our measures, we find empirical evidence for a cointegrating relationship between taxes and output volatility.
In particular, conforming with theoretical results we find that tax effects are not uni-directional: while the labor income tax as well as the corporate income tax are negatively correlated, the capital tax is positively correlated with output volatility. Accounting for potential outliers even strengthens the case for taxes. Indeed taxes are among other robust determinants such as inflation and effective exchange rate variability. In contrast, financial development was not found to be robust. We also confirm a strong empirical link between volatility and growth (Ramey and Ramey 1995). Allowing for more flexible heterogeneity patterns among countries indeed strengthens the observed empirical link.
Households receive net capital payments (1 − τ i )p y t w k t k t , that means net dividends per unit of capital (value marginal productivity) times the amount k t and net labor income (1 − τ i )p y t w t used for saving and consumption purposes. Thus, nominal savings are
Saving will be used for accumulating capital. Beside a tax on wealth, τ a , a fraction
δ of the capital stock disappears as a result of depreciation, which implies that only net (and not gross) capital rewards are taxed,
The relationship in (28) shows that a positive tax on wealth (τ a > 0) simply increases the rate of effective depreciation. We will see later that this tax really applies to wealth, a t , and not the number of machines or stocks, k t . Using (27), the budget constraint reads
Inserting s t , replacing k t with the definition in (27) and using (10) gives
where we defined factor rewards,
A.1.2 The budget constraint of the government (5)
We start by summing up the budget constraint (8) using
where C t denotes C t = Lc t . Transforming a t into units of the capital stock from (27),
and insert it in the aggregated budget constraint yields
where we used Euler's theorem, that is
As the interpretation is straightforward, aggregation is convincing.
A.1.3 The evolution of log-output
Using the definition, G t , the market clearing condition in (9) can be written as
Inserting this into (11) recalling that (dK t /dt)/K t = I t /K t − δ from (2), output follows
Now define log-output, y t ≡ ln Y t , and use Itô's formula to compute the differential dy t ,
where we also inserted capital rewards, r t = Y K = αY t /K t .
A.1.4 The evolution of capital rewards
Using Itô's formula (change of variables), capital rewards,
Now inserting r K = −(1 − α)r t /K t , and replacing Y t /K t = r t /α, we obtain
following the same steps for (I t /K t − δ) needed to obtain (31).
A.2 Explicit solutions
A.2.1 The maximized Bellman equation
The value of an optimal program of (6) is defined by
which denotes the present discounted value of utility evaluated along the optimal program. Following the same steps as in Posch (2007), the Bellman equation reads
where the level of X t immediately after a jump is X t = (exp(ν))
making consumption a function of the state variables. The maximized Bellman equation is
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
The idea of this proof is to show that together with an educated guess of the value function, both the maximized Bellman equation (34) and first order condition (33) are fulfilled. We may guess that the value function reads
To start with we rewrite the policy function using the transformation in (30) as
Using (33) together with (7), and (36), we obtain V a = (φa t ) −σ . Moreover, our guess in (35) implies
where we defined (27), we obtain after some algebra,
Using the condition α = σ with ρf (A t , X t ) = 1−τ i 1+τc
which we finally can solve for φ in (12).
A.2.3 Proof of Corollary 2.2
φK t in the evolution of capital rewards (32), we obtain
We now rewrite the equation by using the condition α = σ, and inserting φ from (12) to
Using the definitions c 1 and c 2 we finally obtain (13).
A.2.4 An explicit solution for capital rewards
The geometric jump-diffusion in (13) is a reducible jump-diffusion process with polynomial drift of degree n = 2. Thus, it can be solved explicitly (cf. Posch 2007),
with
Given the realization of stochastic processes, r t is known explicitly.
A.2.5 Proof of Corollary 2.3
Inserting the policy function C = 1+τ k 1+τc
φK into (31) gives
It denotes an affine SDE which explicit solution is given by (cf. Posch 2007),
where r s is known explicitly from its solution in (37). Now use y t − y t−∆ to obtain (14).
A.2.6 Proof of Corollary 2.4
Using (1), logarithmic output, y t ≡ ln Y t , is
Now inserting the solution C t = 1+τ k 1+τc φK t from Theorem 2.1 yields for the growth rates
Inserting the solutions to the SDEs in (4) and (3), ln
and ln X t − ln X t−∆ = 1 1−α ν(q t − q t−∆ ), respectively, as well as (14) we obtain
which for α = σ is (15).
A.2.7 The expected growth rate
Using the expectation operator with (14) yields
which can be simplified using our explicit solution in (15) to
It follows from the economy's resource constraint (9) that aggregate consumption in expectation can only growth at constant rates indefinitely if it grows at the same expected rate as output. In particular, we observe Eg ∆ = Eg c ∆ , and conclude from (39) that
A.2.8 An alternative solution
The proofs for the following Theorem A.1, Corollary A.2, and Corollary A.3 are analogue to Section A.2.2, Section A.2.3, and Section A.2.5, respectively, and are contained in the Referees' appendix available on request.
Theorem A.1 If σ > 1 and the condition
where
Corollary A.2 The (before tax) rental rate of capital follows
where c 3 ≡
, and c 4 ≡
Corollary A.3 The growth rate of output per unit of time, g ∆ ≡ y t − y t−∆ , reads
Similarly to the derivation of the first moment of capital rewards in (19), the first moment of capital rewards in the constant savings-rate solution reads
Again, the term
refers to the speed of reversion for the after-tax rental rate of capital.
Similar results using uncertain population growth can be found in Merton (1999). Notes: This table reports simulated tax effects on macro variables for technology parameters (ρ, α, σ, δ) = (.03, .75, .75, .1), other parameters (µ, η, λ, ν) = (.01, .02, 0, 0, 0), and taxes (τ i , τc, τ k , τa) = (0, 0, 0, 0). We used N = 4000 (∆ = 1/4) where we cut off the first 199 observations. The measures include the mean and sd of annual output growth rates, the sd of HP-filtered cyclical components, the mean and sd of before-tax capital rewards, the mean and sd of consumption growth rates, the cv of cyclical utility, as well as the sd of cyclical output as percentage deviations from a steady state. Table A .2: Overall tax effects and a plausible tax scenario (relative effects in brackets). Figure 2 ) as well as overall tax effects for technology parameters (ρ, α, σ, δ) = (.03, .75, .75, .1), other parameters (µ, η, λ, ν) = (.01, .02, 0, 0, 0), and taxes (τ i , τc, τ k , τa) = (.3, .1, .075, .075). The tax scenario encompasses a tax cut in τa, as well as an increase in the income tax, τ i . We used N = 4000 (∆ = 1/4) where we cut off the first 199 observations. The measures include the mean and sd of annual output growth rates, the sd of HP-filtered cyclical components, the mean and sd of before-tax capital rewards, the mean and sd of consumption growth rates, the cv of cyclical utility, as well as the sd of cyclical output as percentage deviations from a steady state.
A.3 Simulation results
(τ i , τ c , τ k , τ a ) = (.0, .0, .0, .0) (.3,
A.4 Data appendix
A.4.1 Data sources
The following databases from SourceOECD (http://new.sourceoecd.org) have been used: (2004) Note that total operating surplus (OS) and operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises (OSP U E) is net, that is gross operating surplus minus consumption of fixed capital. Moreover, OS includes the statistical discrepancy.
Mendoza et. al (1994) tax ratios
The household income tax ratio is equal to personal income tax receipts (1100) divided by household income. Household income comprises operating surplus plus mixed income of the private unincorporated sector (OSP U E), property income 20 (P EI), and dependent wage income (W ). Given this, the personal income tax reads
The labor income tax ratio relates individual labor income tax to total labor costs. Note that τ h W allocates household income taxes to labor. All social security charges (2000) and payroll taxes (3000) are also allocated to labor income. Total labor costs consists of compensation from dependent employment, including employers' social security contributions (2200),
The capital tax ratio relates individual capital income (including corporations) and other capital costs to total capital income. Here, τ h (OSP U E + P EI) denotes household income taxes related to capital income. The taxes paid directly out of capital income are corporate 20 P EI corresponds to interest, dividends, and investment receipts in SNA93/ESA95. income taxes (1200), recurrent taxes on immovable property (4100) and taxes on financial and capital transactions (4400), CAP IT AL = τ h (OSP U E + P EI) + 1200 + 4100 + 4400 OS .
The consumption tax ratio is calculated as the sum of general consumption taxes on goods and services (5110) and excise taxes (5121) over the sum of private consumption (C) and government non-wage consumption (G − GW ) at producer costs,
The effective tax of corporate income relates the taxes paid by corporations (1200) to operating surplus of the corporate sector (obtained as a residual OS − OSP U E),
which indicates the average tax burden of corporations. Due to data availability, we make use of reasonable assumptions. The main modifications include on the one hand to approximate OSP U E and P EI by the first 5-year average share of the respective entry on OS that is available. 21 On the other hand, we approximate W by CoE less employer's social security contributions (2200). Overall, our tax ratios are highly correlated with Mendoza et al. tax ratios and modified Carey and Rabesona tax ratios (Tables A.3 and B.1). The detailed tax tables are in a separate appendix. 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2004 
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Notes: These figures give scatter plots of observed volatility measured as the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita against tax rates using the fixed-window (five-year) panel approach. Notes: These figures give scatter plots of observed volatility measured as the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita against tax rates using the fixed-window (five-year) panel approach controlling for other effects (cf. 
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Notes: These figures give scatter plots of observed volatility measured as the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita against tax rates using the fixed-window (ten-year) panel approach. Notes: These figures give scatter plots of observed volatility measured as the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita against tax rates using the fixed-window (ten-year) panel approach controlling for other effects (cf. Table 3, third column).
